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STUDENT NOTE 
Reevaluating ITAR: A Holistic Approach to Regaining Critical 
Market Share While Simultaneously Attaining Robust National 
Security 
Justin Levine* 
ABSTRACT 
This note considers the application of the International Traffic and Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) 
framework and proposes statutory and policy modifications to promote both national security and industry 
growth. ITAR is the regulatory framework that controls the export of munitions and defense technologies 
from the United States. However, as applied, free trade is now grossly over-regulated to such an extent that 
both significant market share and industry opportunity have been lost and national security itself has 
simultaneously been threatened. Due to heavy restrictions, many previous industry partners are now looking 
elsewhere for trade and systematically avoiding the United States for inclusion in research and commerce 
transactions. The ultimate effect of this relieves America of any oversight or involvement in the newest of 
defense technologies while concurrently providing these opportunities to foreign entities such as Russia, 
China, and India. This note proffers a spectrum of recommendations that aim to retain robust national 
security while regaining lost market share and critical trade opportunities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Both the modern expansion of technology and a growing knowledge of warfare create a broader availability 
of instruments and methods that can be used against a nation. Nations developing these instruments thus have an 
incentive, in the interest of their own security, to establish oversight and regulation before releasing these 
technologies into the international stream of commerce. In the United States, it is the International Traffic and 
Arms Regulations (“ITAR”)1 that govern the export of American-born munitions and defense technologies. 
ITAR tracks and evaluates the trade of certain technologies that are classified as “restricted” on the 
United States Munitions List (“USML”). If a good or technology is deemed “restricted” it must be approved 
for trade through the ITAR licensing process. If approved, these technologies can then enter the international 
stream of commerce. Ultimately, the ITAR framework exists to protect American national security by 
blocking the access to sensitive technologies by adverse or untrustworthy entities. While national security is 
a significant concern of the United States, other concerns, primarily economic growth and domestic 
profitability, cannot be dismissed. In recent years, however, this appears to be the case. Because of ITAR 
complications, many American defense and technology businesses have lost considerable market share.2 
In 1999, out of growing concerns for national security, the authority over ITAR was transferred from 
the Department of Commerce to the Department of State.3 Accompanying this transfer were significant 
intensifications in compliance requirements that resulted in a decrease in the number of technologies and 
goods that could freely enter the stream of international commerce.4 These changes led to a stifling of the 
economic growth and profitability of American businesses. 
To date, these changes have altered the face of the United States’ involvement in international trade 
and investment as well as innovation in defense, dual-use,5 and space technology. ITAR’s current 
investigative and licensing processes have weighed down businesses by imposing an excessively heavy 
burden of compliance.6 Some American businesses have engaged in expensive research and development 
(“R&D”), planning, and sales—all within compliance—only to still lose foreign customers due to 
impatience with ITAR export processes.7 For some American firms, the ITAR licensing process has become 
such a burden that they are shifting their resources from developing defense technologies to other less 
restricted industries.8 
From a foreign business perspective, ITAR is more than a mere inconvenience. Foreign states 
previously loyal to American innovators and manufacturers are being driven away from American goods 
                                                 
1 22 C.F.R § 120-130 (2011). 
2 Richard Kusiolek, ITAR Dilemma: Finding The Balance Between Regulation And Profit, SATELLITE TODAY (Jul. 1, 2008), 
http://www.satellitetoday.com/military/milsatcom/ITAR-Dilemma-Finding-The-Balance-Between-Regulation-And-
Profit_23649.html. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 A good is considered “dual-use” if it can be used for both commercial and defense oriented purposes, such as a 
communications satellite. 
6 OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY, ANNUAL 
INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 30 (2011), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct= 
j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.acq.osd.mil%2Fmibp%2Fdocs%2Fannu
al_ind_cap_rpt_to_congress-2011.pdf&ei=o7OIT9ikEcjEtweDrZW-CQ&usg=AFQjCNFeystx9d0VlymVb0ePHF6yA7QpnA. 
7 David Pugliese, Navy says no to buying American; U.S. restrictions on technology can lead to delays, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN 
(Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.canada.com/business/Navy+says+buying+American/2480208/story.html. 
8 OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY, ANNUAL 
INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 33 (2009), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.acq.osd.mil%2Fmibp%2Fdocs%2Fannual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congress-
2009.pdf&ei=Pq6IT82RA8agtwe325DNCQ&usg=AFQjCNH0aaGgMCAhJSJhclMeQ38ToMAvbw. 
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altogether.9 Specifically, they are shifting towards entities with more relaxed export control regulation.10 
More than just isolated examples, however, there is growing momentum among foreign customers and 
businesses going elsewhere to obtain defense technology.11 This shift is causing many U.S. companies to 
abandon ITAR-regulated industries or simply fail altogether.12 
With American competitiveness in these industries dwindling, market voids have been created. As in 
all markets, a void creates an opportunity for competing incumbents or new market entrants. Moreover, 
gaining economic supremacy by capitalizing on market voids in industries such as space and defense 
technology also creates foreign advantages in diplomatic power and a State’s ability to use force. Therefore, 
boosting American competitiveness in these industries promotes national security as well. Losing 
competitive ground has the opposite effect. With countries like China and India stepping up as both space 
and economic players13 and the omnipresent war on terror, the United States cannot afford to fall behind 
either economically or defensively. 
The bolstering of ITAR compliance requirements in 1999 was to keep national security as a high 
priority and maintain an intellectual hold on modern technologies that could potentially be used against the 
United States.14 However, contrary to the intentions of Congress, these changes in ITAR have actually 
increased the potential for national security threats while simultaneously impeded the economic growth of 
America’s defense and technology industries.15 Many independent recommendations to update the ITAR 
language have been offered by participants in these industries. Instead, by making a multitude of policy and 
regulatory recommendations, this article looks beyond the statutory language to offer a long-term, holistic 
approach to regaining domestic market share and robust national security. 
Section I of this article will discuss the history of ITAR and changes leading to the complications in the 
international trade community. Next, section II addresses how these changes are affecting foreign and 
domestic competitiveness. Section III will undertake the current heightened concerns regarding national 
security. Finally, section IV will deliver recommendations that both maintain national security priorities and 
regain economic competitiveness in the international technology industries. 
I. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATE OF ITAR 
As one would expect, exportation of defense and munitions technology is a highly regulated area. In 
the United States, there are two sets of statutes that govern these export controls: the Export Administration 
Act (“EAA”),16 and the Arms Export Control Act (“AEA”).17 The EAA is instructive as to the 
administration of defense goods and technologies.18 The focus of this article on the other hand, sits with the 
AEA, which has a more specific goal of “reducing the international trade in implements of war” by 
restricting which goods and technologies can be exported.19 The AEA is administered by the Department of 
                                                 
9 Pugliese, supra note 7. 
10 See Raymond Colitt, Brazil Favors France’s Rafale Jet, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2010, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/07/brazil-jets-idUSN0710697320100407 (discussing an example of the Brazilian 
government choosing to purchase alternative technology in an effort to avoid engagement with ITAR). 
11 Kalliroi L. Landry, Exploring The Effects Of International Traffic In Arms Regulations Restrictions On Innovation In The 
U.S. Space Industrial Base, 12 (Aug. 2010) (Master of Sci. in Research and Dev. Mgmt. Thesis, Air Force Inst. of Tech.), 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CGYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fdtic%2Ftr%2Ffulltext%2Fu2%2Fa535245.pdf&ei=k6OuT7rnNcLGtweow8HzCA&usg=AFQjCNFrzr
GrKoLuS89K5mzO759p2TdqYA. 
12 Pugliese, supra note 7. 
13 Earthbound, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2008, at 66. 
14 Landry, supra note 11, at 2; Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
15 Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
16 50 App. U.S.C. § 2401. 
17 22 U.S.C. § 2751. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
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State and employed through the Department of Commerce via ITAR.20 The ultimate purpose of ITAR is to 
“prevent sensitive technology from reaching parties hostile to the United States.”21 
Initially, the Department of Commerce maintained authority over the AEA, and thus, control of ITAR.22 
However, in 1999 ITAR authority was transferred to the Department of State due to mounting concerns for 
national security.23 With this new authority, the Department of State now regulates the importation and 
exportation of technology and goods that may be used in hostility against the United States.24 
With the transfer of control to the Department of State, Congress has, in effect, prioritized national 
security over economic growth and profitability. This may appear to have even been the intention of 
Congress. However, the smothering and overbearing effect on economics has not just moved profit concerns 
into a position of subordination, but has essentially pushed them to the sidelines.25 This is evidenced by the 
widespread loss in domestic profits and market share.26 
At the heart of ITAR is the USML and the ITAR licensing process. The USML is a list directly 
managed by the Department of Defense,27 which contains twenty classifications of goods and technologies 
that require an approved export license.28 To obtain an export license, one must first register with the 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls29 and then submit a license application.30 The Department of Defense 
maintains a database of over ten thousand registrants used for tracking and enforcement.31 Currently, to 
remove an item from the USML, the Secretary of Defense must grant approval and give thirty days advance 
notice to Congress.32 
To be efficient and effective in the rapidly changing world of defense technology, the adaptability of 
the USML must not be bound by the slow and burdensome bureaucratic processes of typical government. As 
discussed in section II, it is American businesses that are bearing the cost of these burdens through increased 
compliance and planning expenses or losses in customers and market share. The next section of this article 
illustrates these effects and discusses how ITAR has affected domestic business’ profits and trade relations. 
II. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMPETITIVENESS 
The 1999 increases in ITAR compliance requirements have suppressed U.S. competitiveness in the 
technology, space, and defense industries. The hyper-restrictive nature of ITAR is encouraging foreign 
buyers to look elsewhere.33 For example, between 1999 and 2006, sales of U.S. communication satellites fell 
by twenty percent resulting in nearly $2.5 billion in losses.34 Moreover, illustrative of the growing foreign 
                                                 
20 SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. EXPORT POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC 24 
(May 21, 1999), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CG8QFjAA
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.house.gov%2Fcoxreport%2Fpdf%2Fch9.pdf&ei=JqOuT4mEKYyTtwfn3_3zCA&usg=AFQj
CNGhFYWo-U5lw0S82QCddkPIX9T_cw. 
21 Landry, supra note 11, at 2. 
22 Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
23 Id. 
24 Landry, supra note 11, at 2. 
25 Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
26 Id. 
27 Landry, supra note 11, at 2. 
28 22 C.F.R. § 121. 
29 U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Licensing, EXPORTING REQUIREMENTS (May 12, 2012, 9:33 PM), 
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/index.html; U.S. EXPORT POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC, supra note 21, at 29. 
30 U.S. Department of State, Licensing, supra note 29. 
31 U.S. EXPORT POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC, supra note 20, at 42. 
32 U.S. EXPORT POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC, supra note 20. 
33 Colitt, supra note 10. 
34 Alan Taylor, Defense Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Space Industry Final Report, Air Force Research Laboratory 15 (Aug. 
2007), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fbeta-www.bis.doc.gov%2Findex.php%2Flicensing%2Fforms-documents%2Fdoc_download%2F38-defense-
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movement away from ITAR regulated transactions, between 2009 and 2011 the United States’ share in 
satellite manufacturing revenue suffered a further drop of twenty-seven percent.35 While this is only an 
example of one focused industry, the waning of revenue, employment, competitive confidence, innovation, 
and trading competency is being felt across the entire defense and space technology spectrum.36 
As expected with normal market conditions, a widespread drop in U.S. competitiveness creates market 
voids that allow other foreign States to move in, capitalize, and advance their own market positions. Adjunct 
Professor at the University of Phoenix, Richard Kusiolek, in his article ITAR Dilemma: Finding the Balance 
Between Regulation and Profit, lists some of the countries that are moving into these voids and taking 
advantage of the market opportunities.37 Kusiolek argues that some countries, including “China, Pakistan, 
Russia, Canada, Brazil, Australia, France, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, and Japan have grown their 
commercial space industries, while U.S. companies have seen dramatic losses in customers and market 
share.”38 
In fact, this pattern of foreign entities acquiring market share has actually resulted in the widespread 
foreign momentum away from reliance on U.S. components in foreign technology systems.39 Some foreign 
states are opting to avoid ITAR altogether by completely foregoing the use of American-made components 
in their defense systems.40 One example is Alcatel Space, a French satellite manufacturer that has replaced 
all of the U.S. components on its satellites with foreign components to avoid having to comply with ITAR.41 
Kusiolek does proffer that ITAR isn’t directly to blame for all of the loss in market share. He states that 
business outsourcing also plays a role.42 However, is it reasonable to assume that the uncertainty, confusion, 
and complexity of being ITAR compliant may be at the base of business’ decisions to outsource? It seems 
likely. 
Several studies offer support that ITAR has a direct causal relation to the declining performance 
numbers of American firms. In 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed several 
performance aspects of the United States’ space industry.43 This evaluation explained that the 
uncertainty and long wait times of the ITAR licensing process was negatively affecting industry 
confidence due to a loss of foreign sales and an increase in compliance costs.44 Another study, done by 
the Institute for Defense Analysis in 2007, claimed that ITAR discourages U.S. firms from participating 
in R&D for the Department of Defense because of uncertainty, risks, and over-regulation.45 Finally, in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
industrial-base-assessment-of-the-u-s-space-industry-
2007&ei=OkRfUI2QMoWQ9gTg6oFA&usg=AFQjCNGy4NvbzCbn8wonHOHjzpeAjjyrHw. 
35 FUTRON CORP., 2011 State of the Satellite Industry Report Shows Further Growth in 2010, Satellite Industry Association 2 
(Jun. 2011), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url= 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sia.org%2FPDF%2FFINAL%2520Press_Release_State%2520of%2520the%2520Satellite%2520 
Report%25202011%2520JUNE%25202011.pdf&ei=8kdfUNEEg870BInggaAJ&usg=AFQjCNEaz4ZEfvX8b72tUhzUjDMnrY 
wn2g. 
36 Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the U.S. Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export Controls, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies 32 (Feb. 2008), available at http://csis.org/publication/health-us-space-industrial-base-and-
impact-export-controls; FUTRON CORP., supra note 36, at 1, 2. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Landry, supra note 11. 
40 George Abbey & Neal Lane, United States Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Gone Astray, American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences 5 (2009), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved= 
0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcarnegie.org%2Ffileadmin%2FMedia%2FPublications%2FPDF%2Fspace 
US.pdf&ei=rm1fUNK5Ooj68QTxyoCADw&usg=AFQjCNF-keECofsd9vxa5up0DizL8z-liQ. 
41 Jeff Foust, One Nation, Over Regulated: Is ITAR Stalling the New Space Race?, NATIONAL SPACE SOCIETY (Aug. 7, 2008), 
http://www.nss.org/adastra/volume17/itar.html. 
42 Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
43 Center for Strategic & International Studies, supra note 36. 
44 Id. at 32. 
45 Richard Van Atta, Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 4 (Jan. 2007), 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url= 
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2009, a report conducted by the Office of Under Secretary of Defense claimed that companies are 
withholding their best innovations from the Department of Defense so that they can sell them privately 
at a more favorable price.46 
With the effects of ITAR at the center of these studies, American business concerns have impacted 
U.S. confidence overall and encouraged foreign capabilities.47 In fact, since the boost in ITAR compliance 
standards in 1999, the U.S. market share in the international space technology industry has declined by 
thirty-three percent.48 
In 2010, then-Air Force Major, Kalliroi Landry also conducted a study. Landry submitted 
questionnaires to “any individual or group that participates in the United States space industry through some 
kind of interaction with ITAR.”49 219 entities in total responded to the questionnaire portion of the study or 
were otherwise interviewed.50 These groups spanned from government agencies involved in policy making 
to entities on both sides of private sector transactions.51 Landry’s study participants also included members 
from each tier of businesses.52 
Space (and other) industry participants can be compartmentalized into three tiers based on the scale of 
products that they produce or where they participate within the stream of commerce. Tier 1 companies “sell 
end-products to commercial or government customers.”53 Tier 2 entities “provide major components and/or 
systems to Tier 1 companies.”54 Tier 3 companies “provide less complex components, sub-assemblies, 
structures, and materials.”55 
The chart below represents a tip-of-the-iceberg snapshot of Landry’s research. The results have been 
separated into a “Consequences, Effects, and Desired Changes” format. This brief representation of 
Landry’s study will shed light on the ultimate objective of this article—to address the consequences and 
effects of the current state of ITAR and recommending some changes desired by the defense and technology 
community at large. Recall that Landry had a total of 219 respondents.56 However, not every respondent 
addressed every question.57 The below percentages are only from the total number of responses to each 
specific question or set of questions. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
http%3A%2F%2F www.acq.osd.mil%2Fmibp%2Fdocs%2Fida_study-export_controls_%2520us_def_ib.pdf&ei= 
onFfUIP5KJGo8QTXwICICg&usg=AFQjCNHRL2SFesa19RPuK61ybKigv0q7Pw. 
46 OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 8. 
47 Landry, supra note 11, at 11, 24. 
48 Earthbound, supra note 13. 
49 Landry, supra note 11, at 28. 
50 Id. at 30-31. 
51 Id. at 28. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 31. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 30-31. 
57 Id. at 51, 54, 66 (study findings were noted in percentage of total responses). 
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Consequences of ITAR % of Responses 
Increased Costs 52.94 %58 
Timelines Too Long 47.06 %59 
Encourage Foreign Competition 35.29 %60 
Unable to Market or Sell to Foreign 29.41 %61 
Stalls Communication 29.41 %62 
  
Effects of ITAR % of Responses 
Continued Drawdown of U.S. Suppliers 47.06 %63 
Limited Access to the Best Talent 35.29 %64 
Foreign Approach to Export Controls Differs from U.S. 35.29 %65 
Withdraw from the Space Industry 23.53 %66 
  
Desired Changes to ITAR % of Responses 
Review and Revision of ITAR 41.18 %67 
Update/Re-Focus Export Controls 35.29 %68 
Clarify/Simplify the Language 23.53 %69 
While this graphical depiction shows only a snapshot of the results most identified by respondents, it is 
illustrative of a common view among industry participants. In addition to the above, some numbers worth 
noting are: 
x The top factor for foreign products being competitive is “Export Licensing Requirements” 
(follow by cost);70 
x The top five recommendations to improve innovation in the space industry are directly related to 
changes, updates, or revisions to ITAR;71 
x 51.91% suggested U.S. Government action to improve market competitiveness;72 
                                                 
58 Id. at 36. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 41. 
64 Id. at 45. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 36. 
67 Id. at 43. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 51. 
71 Id. at 43. 
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x 88.52% gave ITAR related responses when asked about “Barriers to Entry into Foreign 
Countries.”73 This is opposed to a mere 2.73% of participants that claimed EU limitations as a 
barrier into a foreign country.74 
Landry’s research, however, also revealed some numbers that were inconsistent with the above trend. 
For example, only 5.88% of respondents predicted losing further business opportunities. However, not all of 
Landry’s numbers take into account the differentiation between the tiers or size of companies. These are 
important distinctions because, as Landry herself stated, “[a]s a percent of foreign sales, the cost burden on 
Tier 3 companies is nearly eight times that of Tier 1 firms.”75 Therefore, answers to a question about ITAR 
compliance costs might be very different between Tier 1 and Tier 3 companies. One must also consider the 
advantages larger organizations hold over smaller entities. These advantages include legal counsel, 
dedicated legal departments, and funding available for ITAR training and compliance—all factors that 
enable larger firms to efficiently cope with the burdens of ITAR. Therefore, one must consider who is 
answering each question, and why. 
Despite the elevated cost burden on Tier 3 companies, they invest a much higher percentage of internal 
funds into R&D and ITAR compliance as compared to Tier 1 companies.76 Thus, the ability to grow by 
smaller firms that deal with USML goods is being restrained, while the larger firms are (relatively) more 
protected.77 As a whole, however, the growth of U.S. companies has still been stifled, whereas foreign 
entities have collectively continued to progress.78 Intensifying this effect on domestic profitability, lower-tier 
companies (Tier 3) are a paramount source of technology and innovation.79 Thus, it is in the best interest of 
the United States to relieve these companies of the costly compliance burden and to nurture and promote the 
smaller firms, rather than hinder them. 
Landry further explains that the punitive threat of noncompliance is so great80 that U.S. firms are 
turning their innovative focus to other, less-regulated industries.81 The penalties for being ITAR 
noncompliant are significant and readily assessed if proper measures are not followed. A single violation can 
significantly affect the operating expenses of smaller firms.82 “Given the ease with which violations can 
occur, inadvertent violations by unaware companies and their officers can have drastic consequences.”83 
ITAR language expressly states: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
72 Id. at 52. 
73 Id. at 54. 
74 Id. 
75 Center for Strategic & International Studies, supra note 36, at 33. 
76 Taylor, supra note 34, at 36; See also Guy Ben-Ari, et al., National Security and the Commercial Space Sector: Initial Analysis 
and Evaluation of Options for Improving Commercial Access to Space, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
26 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCQQF 
jAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcsis.org%2Ffiles%2Fpublication%2F100430_berteau_commercial_space.pdf&ei= 
Y4BfUPW_BYre8ATP3IHoBw&usg=AFQjCNEFQuHL1ZSyl7Zdlcho7v4ty0ypbA (stating that while large firms can invest 
between 1.5 to 2 percent of their revenue on internal research and development, smaller firms can invest as much as 15 percent). 
77 Kusiolek, supra note 2. 
78 Id. 
79   ITAR and the U.S. Space Industry, Space Foundation 1 (2008), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= 
&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.spacefoundation.org%2Fdocs%2FSpace 
Foundation_ITAR.pdf&ei=cYlfUKzpDoee8QS1tYHIBA&usg=AFQjCNFKKcjckKXfgJBmUrwbQfXzGb0Luw; See also 
Guy Ben-Ari, et al., supra note 77. 
80 Landry, supra note 11, at 39. 
81 Id. at 40. 
82 ITAR Compliance, ExportRules.com, (2011-12), available at http://www.exportrules.com/ (conducting a comparative analysis 
between sections “$50,000 in ITAR Fines,” “ITAR Export Exemptions,” and “Export Enforcement Actions in 2007”). 
83 Id. 
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Any person who willfully [or criminally] violates any provision . . . or regulation . . . shall . . . be 
fined for each violation not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both84 . . . the civil penalty for each violation . . . may not exceed $500,000.85 
Smaller market participants, however, are not the only firms feeling these negative effects of ITAR. 
The penalties from ITAR violations are being applied across the board of space and defense industries. 
Despite being better “equipped” to handle ITAR’s obstacles, large firms are also sustaining harsh penalties 
for noncompliance, including: 
x Boeing – $32.2 million since 199886 
x Lockheed Martin – $17 million since 200087 
x L3 Communications – $1.5 million since 200688 
x Motorola – $750,000 since 200189 
x Northrup Grumman – $15 million since 200890 
Since the change in authority in 1999, there have been at least twenty-nine reported incidences of 
noncompliance, all resulting in heavy penalties.91 This is compared to only twelve in the prior twenty-two 
years.92 
In addition to purely monetary penalties, actual compliance costs can detract significantly from 
profits or cash available for reinvestment. Compliance expenses can include licensing fees, training, 
dedicated compliance personnel, and legal fees. Administrative penalties can further include the 
prevention of the exportation of goods, interim suspensions, and seizures of goods and transportation 
vessels.93 If a company believes that it may have violated one of ITAR’s provisions, its best course of 
action may be to submit a voluntary disclosure. Under 22 C.F.R. § 127.12, a company’s voluntary 
disclosure can serve “as a mitigating factor in determining the administrative penalties, if any, that should 
be imposed.”94 
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These penalties and burdens on U.S. firms are not going unrecognized, nor are they something that 
has appeared overnight. So why does it appear that the Federal government is remaining passive and 
allowing these burdens to continue by moving very slowly, if at all, to relieve American manufacturers, 
innovators, and trading partners from the strain of ITAR? Consider the mission statement for the export 
control laws, and it becomes clear: 
“The U.S. Government views the sale, export, and re-transfer of defense articles and defense 
services as an integral part of safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign 
policy objectives.”95 
The federal government has indubitably prioritized national security and policy over economic 
growth.96 The aforementioned studies show a correlation between ITAR compliance and the United States’ 
declining foreign market position.97 With the weakening of U.S. competitiveness, foreign entities are 
capitalizing on new market voids. International market shifts like these can lead tangentially to other 
concerns—such as the deterioration of national security. The next section will address national security and 
American foreign relations concerns that have arisen from the increase in ITAR compliance requirements. 
III. DOMESTIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The heightening of ITAR compliance standards was carried out because of growing Congressional 
concerns of threats to national security.98 At the genesis was the failed 1996 launch of a Chinese “Long 
March Rocket.”99 In the most simplistic recount of the incident, the approval of the export license for the 
rocket, built by a U.S. company, Space Systems/Loral (“Loral”), had faced significant criticism.100 When the 
launch failed, the criticism materialized into fears that American secrets had been passed to the Chinese101 
and Loral was ultimately charged with a violation of the AEAǤ102 
This controversy led to concerns of exploitable weaknesses in the American export policy—the 
potential for breaches in national security. As previously mentioned, in 1999 Congress reactively authorized 
the lateral transfer of the ITAR regulatory authority to the Department of State.103 This transfer is important 
when one considers the Department of State’s natural inclination toward national security over that of the 
Department of Commerce. The transfer has effectively enabled the prioritization of national security over 
economic growth and profitability. Ultimately, this transfer of ITAR authority—designed to curb any 
weakness in national security—has de-prioritized economic growth to such an extent that the U.S. security 
shield has been thinned. As mentioned, the increase in ITAR compliance requirements has encouraged 
foreign States to move away from engaging the United States in trade and collaborative research efforts, 
thereby decreasing the American technology advantage. 
The ostracization of the United States from development projects encourages other nations to 
collaborate in R&D efforts that would otherwise have included the United States. This gives these foreign 
entities access to information, which under different circumstances would have been privileged to the U.S. 
and its partners.104 The included foreign nations also gain the opportunity to profit from these projects,105 
representing another important opportunity lost by the United States. 
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Stemming from frustrations with ITAR, foreign sellers of space and defense technologies now actively 
avoid the United States, preferring other, more cooperative buyers. This affords American competitors and 
enemies the opportunity to acquire the newest in technologies. By the very nature of their policy, some of these 
buyers pose potential threats, in clear adversity to American national security policy. These are the very security 
threats that Congress attempted to minimize in 1999 with its revisions of ITAR. Moreover, with the growing 
momentum away from American technology, the United States loses the advantage of having firsthand 
knowledge and expertise of the leading technologies around the world. This can lead to significant inadequacies 
in the United States’ ability to defend itself, while also undermining the United States’ ability to innovate, attract 
foreign customers,106 and collaborate with foreign entities. 
ITAR is also affecting established relationships with friendly foreign states. “Frustrated” accurately 
describes the international sentiment toward ITAR. For example, in 2010, Canada withdrew from using 
certain American-built parts when modernizing key systems on its naval fleet.107 This decision came about 
when the Canadian navy was “faced with delays and restrictions [from the United States] about what it can 
and cannot do”108 in upgrading some of its systems. The United States’ northern neighbor expressed its 
desire to be free from bureaucratic restriction or having to seek permission from the United States when 
looking to upgrade, repair, or modify its systems.109 
As a result, and to the detriment of U.S. technology firms, “the [new Canadian] command-and-control 
system will be free of any U.S. export controls.”110 On its face, this may appear to be merely an isolated 
instance of economic loss. However, the Canadian withdrawal from American components in this instance is 
only one example of many ITAR-related hold-ups and restrictions for U.S. equipment and technology into 
Canada.111 It is further illustrative of the shift away from U.S. parts that is growing outside American 
borders.112 In short, this is not an isolated incident.113 
With the exclusion of the United States from the Canadian sale, Canada turned to a collaboration 
of foreign firms (representing Sweden, Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands) to develop the naval 
system.114 These foreign companies can now market the new system to other entities, without American 
oversight. The negative effects of this exchange can include, i) an economic boost for foreign firms, ii) 
the access of cutting-edge technology by adverse entities, and iii) lost American opportunities to 
collaborate,115 profit, and control access. This scenario exemplifies the potential depth of losing more 
and more technology opportunities due to the growing global frustration with ITAR compliance.116 
Thales, a global leader in the aerospace, transportation, and defense and security markets, reported a 
“spike in desire for ITAR-free equipment . . . from military forces around the world.”117 The strain from 
ITAR even has Britain, America’s most important global defense partner, frustrated.118 So much so that the 
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Defense Industry Daily, a UK defense publication, analogized Britain’s growing resentment towards ITAR 
to the Boston Tea Party.119 
During the Clinton administration, the United States ensured that Britain would receive a waiver 
around the difficult ITAR licensing process, giving it access to U.S. defense technology.120 Years later, at 
the end of George W. Bush’s first term, Britain had still not received the waiver and was understandably 
“becoming increasingly angry.”121 Exacerbating this resentment, Britain at the time was fighting alongside 
America in the Operation Iraqi Freedom conflict.122 
During wartime, sharing technology holds a unique and critical function in the interoperability among 
allies.123 The Defense Industry Daily reported, “British and Australian officers serving in Iraq alongside the 
United States [were] sometimes barred from operations briefings because they aren’t cleared to receive [the] 
information.”124 One can imagine the embarrassment and irritation between battlefield counterparts, 
notwithstanding the potentially fatal interference with the efficiency and efficacy of wartime operations. To 
illustrate the breadth of ITAR’s negative operational effect, ITAR restrictions were applied to: 
“furnishing of assistance, including training to foreign persons in the design, engineering, 
development, production, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, 
modification, or reconstruction of defense articles, whether in the United States or abroad” or 
furnishing of technical data.”125 
Therefore, not only must the United States’ battlefield allies cope with the hardships of war, they must 
also struggle against the bureaucratic difficulties of ITAR as well. Yet ITAR remains uncompromising in 
joint operations. Accordingly, United States’ wartime co-operators may be left with inclinations of distrust 
and resentment126 as they are working with a partner who asks for help, then “pushes back” in resistance. 
ITAR frustration between allies also extends beyond the battlefield. In one deal, between the United 
States and Britain and described as “the largest single global defense program in history,” Britain 
encountered ITAR resistance in the sharing of technical information with the United States.127 The deal, 
valued at $382 billion, was aimed at supplying fighter jets to the United States, Britain, and other 
countries.128 After the withholding of certain information, a British defense committee demanded assurance 
from the United States that all technical information regarding the project would be provided to Britain by 
the end of the year, or threats of Britain not buying into the project may materialize.129 While this disconnect 
was eventually settled, it serves as another example of a growing resentment between the United States and 
its closest allies, rooted in ITAR. 
Brazil has also made strategic decisions to avoid the United States in defense partnerships and deals.130 
In 2010, Brazil chose the more expensive French Rafale jet over Boeing’s cheaper F-18, despite both planes 
meeting all of Brazil’s requirements.131 When considering market norms, this decision is counterintuitive. 
Given perfect substitutes, a rationale consumer should choose the cheaper alternative. However, Brazilian 
Defense Minister Nelson Jobim expressed the nation’s concern with America’s history of sensitive 
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technology embargoes and that “the United States Government could give no upfront guarantee” that 
another technology embargo would not occur.132 Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva stated that the 
“choice was not technical but political and strategic.”133 This deal amounted to thirty-six fighter jets, valued 
at over four billion dollars,134 and a lost opportunity for the U.S. to develop a working relationship with a 
worthy ally and promising economy. It further represents another example of the United States losing 
opportunities to be involved in a global defense deal. 
Along Brazil’s northern border lies Venezuela, which represents a more hostile example of the foreign 
effects of ITAR. While Venezuela is a major supplier of oil to the United States,135 there is a long history of 
turbulent relations between the two nations. Nevertheless, in 1983, the United States sold Venezuela a fleet 
of F-16 fighter jets.136 In response to a U.S. ban on arms sales, in 2006 Venezuela threatened to sell the fleet 
of F-16’s to Iran.137 In actuality however, it had been some time that Venezuela was considering options for 
replacing this fleet due to long-standing frustrations with ITAR.138 After the 1999 increase in ITAR 
restrictions, the United States halted the sale of replacement parts and upgrades for the jets, thus prompting 
Venezuela’s desire to sell the fleet.139 In addition to selling the jets to Iran, Venezuela had also considered 
China and Cuba.140 Moreover, Venezuela was considering replacing the F-16 fleet with a new fleet of state-
of-the-art Russian Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters.141 This represents lost American opportunities both to profit 
and retain control of the technology in use by a foreign nation. Of course, the latter represents a serious 
potential threat to the security of the United States. 
Meanwhile, as historically hostile Venezuela is contemplating increasing its arms capabilities with state-
of-the-art foreign technology, American defense companies are withholding their best products from the 
federal government in the hope of simply avoiding engagement with ITAR.142 Further threatening the national 
security of the United States, the withheld American technology is being sold on the open market depriving the 
U.S. government of that technology and providing foreign entities the opportunity to obtain it.143 
Finally, American educational institutions are also suggesting that ITAR is keeping bright foreign 
students from coming to the United States to study; minimizing foreign contribution to domestic research and 
innovation.144 An assessment done at MIT shows a correlation between simultaneously increased ITAR and 
visa requirements, and a significant decline in foreign student enrollment in American universities.145 If 
capable foreign students are being kept from contributing to American research and innovation, they may seek 
this opportunity elsewhere and, to that end, contribute to the intellectual capital pools of foreign entities. 
These examples are illustrative of how ITAR is contributing to the threat of the United States’ national 
security. The 1999 changes to ITAR—originally designed to make the United States more secure—have 
frustrated the United States’ allies, alienated it from international defense collaborations, and angered other 
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foreign States. In essence, by shifting the focus of ITAR solely to national security, both economic 
competitiveness and national security have suffered.146 The next and final section will suggest changes and 
solutions to the current state of ITAR and propose recommendations that will lead to favorable compromises 
between national security, foreign relations, and economic growth. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many industry participants and evaluators have suggested changes to ITAR to give the United States a 
boost in market competitiveness.147 However, there seems to be a commonality between the suggestions; a 
focus on “patchwork regulation.” Patchwork regulation is the idea of regulation-on-top-of-regulation to 
solve a problem. But patchwork regulation may only solve temporary and symptomatic issues. In a case 
such as this, however, it does not resolve a fundamentally flawed system. For example, Landry and her 
respondents’ primary suggestion was an update of the USML.148 While this recommendation will relieve a 
limited number of items from the restrictive grip of the USML, making the trade of those goods easier for 
certain organizations, it will do so only until the next evolution in technology. Instead, given the necessity 
for a long-term, effective solution, a more holistic approach is needed. Here, the big picture must be 
considered. This is not to say that the United States must scrap the entire body of current export control 
laws, but a multi-faceted approach is warranted. 
United States Air Force Major General Robert Dickman, the Executive Director of the American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, understands this. In a similar effort as this article—the 
provocation of revisions to legislation and policy—Dickman delivered a testimonial to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology and suggested changes to aid in the economic 
recovery of the relevant technology industries.149 
In his testimony, Dickman suggests a system based on “by exception” as opposed to the current “by 
approval” method.150 A “by approval” regulatory system is the practice by which prior to any trade over 
international borders, a good or technology must be approved by an authority. As applied here, this system 
has shown to be cumbersome and detrimental. In contrast, a “by exception” system encourages the 
freedom of general trans-border trade but still affords regulators the power to prevent the flow of select 
goods or technologies (the exceptions).151 A “by exception” system promotes collaboration, partnerships, 
trading, and profitability. A new regulatory framework should be one that encourages robust, economic 
growth while at the same time, continuing to advance national security. The following recommendations 
seek to do just that. 
USML REVISION(S) 
In his testimony, Dickman lays the groundwork for several necessary and essential considerations on 
how to improve industry profitability.152 However, for the United States to realize a significant and 
permanent growth in market share and profitability, policy makers must go further than Dickman’s 
recommendations. Initially the most common and obvious recommendation, as many suggest, is an update 
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of the USML.153 Dickman correctly claims that “one of the problems with the current list is that [it] has not 
been examined comprehensively since [its] inception.”154 
Both Dickman and Landry call for each item on the USML to be evaluated.155 At the most basic level, 
some USML items are readily available elsewhere, thus any justification for inclusion on the list is moot. In 
other area’s, foreign technology has been shown to outperform U.S. innovation.156 Again, with even more 
sophisticated products readily available elsewhere, the United States should not withhold its own products 
from trade on the sole basis of national security. Finally, items with outdated defense uses that can now only 
be used in commercial ways do not pose a threat to national security and thus, should also be excluded from 
the restrictive scrutiny of the USML. 
Remaining items deemed to be defense-orientated or dual-use should next be evaluated. The 
intended goal for these items is to, if appropriate, permit a less stringent licensing process. Factors to be 
considered include the entity to which the item is being exported, the level of availability of the item 
elsewhere, or a collective analysis as to how significant this item is as a part of a sensitive United States 
defense or munitions system.157 In addition to an initial evaluation, Dickman suggests continued 
periodic reexaminations of the USML with subsequent revisions following every twelve months.158 
Given the ever-changing environment of the technology industry, continuous USML revisions are 
critical. 
In sum, there is an accumulation of components on the USML that lack the sufficient rationale to 
justify restriction.159 To that end, the re-evaluations of the USML are the “quick-fix” that can help American 
companies in the short-term. Future revisions will become less laborious as the USML is trimmed down to 
accommodate the new ultimate objective of ITAR—boosting market competitiveness while maintaining 
robust national security. 
TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency of the administration and application of ITAR must increase so that firms may plan 
efficient business models. The aforementioned revisions of the USML will only allow firms to realize 
immediate results. However any long-term benefits may stop there, as much of the confusion and frustration 
regarding ITAR compliance will still be present. With technology industries constantly evolving, what might 
equate to profitability now may not in the near future. Therefore increasing transparency, by publishing the 
“constants” of the regulatory system, will be critical to regaining market superiority. For example, currently 
“[t]here is . . . a lack of explanation for how a component is evaluated for export release and how decisions 
are made in the certification process,” states Dickman.160 The ITAR regulatory authority must establish and 
publish a standard for future reevaluations. Frequent and continued reevaluations of the USML will only 
complicate both innovative and sales planning for market participants if there are incessant surprises as to 
what is included or excluded from the USML. A published standard will eliminate this. 
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 
Next, there are several problems with simply revising the USML and increasing transparency. The 
necessity for long-term and permanent growth requires more than just regulatory and policy changes. As 
with any business, permanent and effective growth also requires investment. 
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First, an increase in human capital should be considered to bolster the ITAR administrative and 
licensing office. In recent years, the licensing office has been “streamlined” to make it more efficient.161 
However, like with any business trying to expand, a growth in administration cannot go overlooked. 
Initially, greater manpower will be needed to conduct a reexamination of the USML. A team should then be 
established to continue reevaluations and that would also act as a liaison between ITAR’s administrative 
processes and industry participants. 
As previously mentioned, small companies and foreign buyers/sellers are losing both time and money 
navigating their way through the export control laws. Rather than continuing to push all of the expense onto 
these entities, a greater return on investment may be realized by employing experts in the ITAR control and 
licensing office who can serve in both advisory and consulting capacities. 
In conjunction with transparency, a practical understanding must be readily available to market 
participants. In this period of regrowth, it is critical that companies and foreign entities have free or 
inexpensive access to an easy understanding of ITAR’s processes. An increased staff will ease the 
compliance process for inquiring entities or simply aid in a seamless transition for new participants into the 
system. Here, new entrants are critical for regaining market share and their ability to work smarter through 
transparency is their greatest tool. The more transparent a system is, the less ambiguity is faced within the 
market and the easier it is for market participants to implement ITAR-compliant business models. Less 
ambiguity also leads to proper planning and ultimately will allow significant savings of time, frustration, and 
compliance related expenses. This can all be accomplished with an investment in administrative staff, which 
can then aid in a global understanding of ITAR. 
Dickman also recognized a significant need for reinvestment in the United States’ R&D facilities. 
Reinvestment in research facilities must not be limited to only domestic development, however, but also for 
the purpose of attracting foreign researchers and innovators.162 “Nations no longer need to come to the 
United States for [its] knowledge, facilities, or technology because of [its] restrictions,” states Dickman.163 
The goal is to encourage foreign minds to physically come to the United States and collaborate with 
American researchers in American facilities. By promoting the collaboration of research efforts on 
American soil, partnerships can further be developed for American benefit. Additionally, one can expect the 
growth in collaboration to yield an increase in the sophistication, quality, and breadth of ideas and products 
developed within the United States. 
Finally, an “industry infrastructure reinvestment” is not as simple as approving generous funding for 
modern equipment and facilities. Applying capital to infrastructure is useless without a competent workforce 
to maximize the value of the infrastructure investment. Therefore, scientists, students, innovators and other 
manpower must be available to employ these resources for the American global advantage. A need for bright 
minds, both foreign and domestic, leads to the next recommendation—a change in American visa policy to 
attract foreign intellect to the United States. 
POLICY CHANGES TO ENCOURAGE GROWTH IN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
Currently, American participants in global defense technology industries are, in one form or another, 
losing competitive ground on the international stage.164 Dickman accurately states that “[w]e need to 
develop policies that allow and encourage U.S. researchers [and innovators] to talk and share ideas, findings, 
and recommendations without a fear of violating U.S. trade policy.”165 Therefore, in addition to a monetary 
investment in infrastructure, there must be an accompanying investment in human capital. The first step 
involves a boost of domestic human capital in research, education, and innovation.
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Second, a controlled relaxation in American visa policy will allow promising foreign intellect—
notably, foreign students and professors—to come to the United States and work in collaborative efforts.166 
A focused relaxation of the visa policy in conjunction with the reinvestment in the R&D infrastructure will 
naturally encourage foreign students and professors to study and teach at American universities.167 
Increasing student diversity in America’s educational institutions can also foster early relationships between 
American and foreign students and set a stage for the sharing of ideas during the most basic levels of 
research and education. Additionally, it will enlarge the available talent pool that will subsequently flow into 
the working industry after post-secondary education.168 As an aside, if talented foreign students are studying 
in America, they will not be contributing to foreign competitors’ up-and-coming intellect pool.169 Finally, 
foreign professors who come and teach will bring with them different perspectives and thus afford 
America’s students the benefit of a more expansive breadth of scientific and innovative theory and 
application. 
EXPEDITIOUS DEALING WITH PREVIOUS TRADING PARTNERS OR FRIENDLY ENTITIES 
Beyond updating the USML, the licensing of transactions for entities with which an extensive positive 
trading history has been established should be handled expeditiously and on a less intrusive and instigative 
scale. A few obvious examples include, but are not limited to, Britain, France, and Canada. This is not to say 
that no restrictions should be placed on transactions with these entities at all. However, the relationship and 
trading frequency between with these foreign states and the United States should be recognized, if not for 
the sake of partisanship, than for economy. For example, a preliminary investigation may be completed and 
deemed sufficient to serve for a set number for future transactions. That preliminary investigation may be 
renewed annually, or as otherwise needed. 
COLLECTIVE LICENSING 
The ITAR authority might also consider “collective” company licenses for reputable and established 
firms. Such licenses may govern a set or subset of similar items and allow specific trading activity without 
individualized approval for each item. Specific company licenses can be tailored as narrowly or as broadly 
as is appropriate. “Collective licensing” will relieve the laborious process of investigating and issuing many 
individualized licenses. This form of licensing will aid all parties to the transaction, including the licensing 
office. To that end, collective licensing will promote company savings by cutting down on administrative 
expenses as well as promoting the efficacy of the licensing office by further streamlining the efficient use of 
human capital. 
GRANTS OR TAX INCENTIVES 
Next, grants or tax incentives may be considered for smaller firms trying to maintain or establish a 
presence in an industry. It has been discussed, that by the very nature of being a smaller company, these 
firms can have difficulty remaining ITAR compliant.170 Common characteristics of smaller entities that aid 
in the difficulty of being ITAR compliant include a lack of legal counsel, dedicated legal departments, or 
funds for employee training and compliance. This is a significant concept that should not go overlooked as 
lower-tier companies provide significant innovation in both niche and larger technology markets.171 Grants 
to help relieve the burden of compliance expenses can help smaller firms return to their specialties and again 
rise to the level of competitiveness that has been seen in the past. 
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Moreover, incentives for companies who plan and enter into trade contracts early might be considered. 
Early contracting promotes both time and money savings by enabling ample time for the government to 
complete any administrative needs without delaying transactions. Monetary incentives can reward early 
contracting, thereby decreasing the risk of either party abandoning the transaction later on. Thus, this can 
help to lock in business and promote future trading relations. Finally, other grants or tax incentives might be 
acknowledged for those transactions that serve state interests. 
POST-EXPORTATION TRADING FREEDOM 
Revisions to pre-exportation policy are not the only changes to be considered. Certain actions by the 
ITAR authority after exportation of the original item can continue to aid in the profitable operations of 
domestic firms.172 For instance, allowing the license-free exportation of replacement components for 
systems that have already been approved and exported would encourage both efficient and profitable trade 
practices. This can also be applicable to the modification and upgrade of systems173 as well, although some 
newly developed replacement components of sensitive, pre-existing systems may still warrant individual 
investigation. Ultimately, however, allowing simple replacement parts and certain upgrade components to 
leave the country unobstructed can benefit future business operations without threatening national security. 
AUTOMATION OF ITAR ADMINISTRATION ON INDUSTRY SIDE 
The final recommendation of this article requires action on the part of industry participants—the automation 
of ITAR compliance administration. An efficient and effective regulated trade system requires cooperation on 
both sides—government and industry participants. Both Microsoft and Enterprise Content Management have 
developed compliance software systems that streamline ITAR compliance administrative tasks for business and 
research entities.174 These systems aid in the minimization of company costs while maximizing the use of 
company time. Additional benefits include the acceleration of processing and the elimination of both redundant 
tasks and dependencies on personnel. The implementation of systems such as these throughout the industry will 
harmonize its participants, compliment government regulatory improvements, and yield an ITAR framework that 
promotes both national security and profitable trade practices. 
In sum, changes to the ITAR framework and its effects on both global and domestic trade and 
innovation must be considered. Considerations however, must go beyond a mere revision of the USML and 
ITAR framework where many suggestions stop. The foregoing recommendations, if taken together, provide 
the holistic approach necessary to regain long-term and robust market superiority for American business 
while maintaining dependable national security. 
CONCLUSION 
“In the production of its 787 and B-2 ‘Stealth Bomber,’ Boeing had to take drastic measures and 
backtrack some of its technology, at great expense, due to ITAR concerns.”175 This article has focused on 
these concerns, where significant economic shortcomings have been compelled by current ITAR 
requirements. The 1999 increases in ITAR compliance were predicated on heightened concerns of national 
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security. However, this left critical goals, such as industrial growth and profitability, as inferior objectives. 
The effects of the ITAR revisions have now come full circle and actually detracted from the stability of the 
United States’ national security. The revisions empowered foreign entities, augmented their technological 
capabilities, and increased the potential for adverse actions against the United States. 
Economically, the revisions have increased both transaction costs and times, hindered the ability to 
grow a business, and relinquished profitable opportunities to foreign entities.176 Moreover, the hyper-
restrictive nature of ITAR has lead to a costly foreign “ITAR-free” movement away from American 
products.177 The ITAR framework must be reevaluated and ultimately, changes must be made. 
This article preliminarily suggests a revision of the USML relieving many items of the need for 
individualized approval. Subsequent USML revisions must continue for the legislation to remain up-to-date 
and in support of U.S. competitiveness. Also accompanying these revisions must be transparency and an 
established standard of the revision process. Established USML revision factors will allow firms and 
research entities to effectively plan compliance into their business operations. 
Next, the United States should consider “collective licensing” and expedited, less-inquisitive 
investigations for entities with an established trading history and similar economic and social outlooks. In 
conjunction with this idea is the automatic approval of replacement parts or (some) upgrades for systems 
that have already been exported to an end buyer. This will foster relationships, promote future business, and 
reduce wasteful licensing and frustration over wait times. On the company side, implementing automated 
ITAR software can further decrease redundancy while boosting accuracy and trim expenses. 
Next, grants and tax incentives should be considered for smaller to medium size firms in an effort to 
ease their burden of compliance. Providing grants or other financial relief, will enable smaller firms to 
remain competitive and grow within their respective industries. Alongside direct federal relief, Congress 
must also consider reinvestment into the R&D infrastructure. Government contribution in this area will 
again modernize the nation’s testing and science facilities, thus attracting foreign scientists, researchers, and 
developers. 
Finally, a controlled relaxation of visa policy will allow promising foreign students and professors to 
come study and teach, respectively, at American universities. Lifted visa restrictions will also enable 
desirable researchers and innovators to retain a permanent or long-term working status for which to build 
working relationships with their American colleagues. Ultimately, this will promote foreign collaboration, 
broaden domestic opportunities to earn profit, and nurture a broader pool of promising student intellect from 
which to employ in future development projects. 
The need for significant change to current export control policy is evidenced by the severe domestic 
shortcomings in today’s global markets. A holistic reevaluation and advancement of ITAR and export 
control policy is necessary to regain the lost superiority by American firms in the defense and technology 
industries. Implementing the foregoing changes to the ITAR framework and beyond, national security can 
remain strong without having to sacrifice robust economic competitiveness in global markets. 
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